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 EDITOR’S NOTE 
 The Editorial Board is particularly pleased to publish this piece in this volume 
of the Maine Law Review.  On the heels of the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari 
in Kentucky v. King, the members of the Board, together with their classmates, 
devoted many days (and nights) to scrutinizing jurisprudence on exigent 
circumstances.  The academic endeavor—part of the first-year legal writing course 
at the University of Maine School of Law—involved taking on the role of 
Petitioner or Respondent, crafting an appellate brief, and taking part in mock oral 
arguments before panels of law school professors and members of Maine’s bench 
and bar.  Ms. Drake’s article brings us full circle. 
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KENTUCKY V. KING:  A NEW APPROACH TO 
CONSENT-BASED POLICE ENCOUNTERS? 
Jamesa J. Drake* 
INTRODUCTION 
The exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement permits the 
police to enter a private residence, without prior judicial approval, whenever the 
police have an objectively reasonable basis for believing that the destruction of 
evidence is imminent or underway.1  The United States Supreme Court’s most 
recent pronouncement in the exigent circumstances realm—Kentucky v. King2—is 
not a case about exigent circumstances per se.  Instead, King concerns the “police-
created exigency” doctrine, a concept that the vast majority of federal and state 
courts already recognize.3  This doctrine adds a crucial caveat to the exigent 
circumstances rule, but it is not new.  It provides that the police “may not rely on 
the need to prevent destruction of evidence when that exigency was ‘created’ or 
‘manufactured’” by the police themselves.4   
Additionally, King attempts to settle an arguable split among the lower federal 
and state courts about the type of conduct that “creates” exigent circumstances.  
King holds that the exigent circumstances exception applies when “the police do 
not gain entry to premises by means of an actual or threatened violation of the 
Fourth Amendment.”5   In other words,  
the exigent circumstances rule justifies a warrantless search when the conduct of 
the police preceding the exigency is reasonable in the same sense.  Where . . . the 
police did not create the exigency by engaging or threatening to engage in conduct 
that violates the Fourth Amendment, warrantless entry to prevent the destruction 
of evidence is reasonable and thus allowed.6   
The first part of the rule announced in King is tautological.  Plainly, the police 
may not engage in conduct that violates the Fourth Amendment and then lawfully 
enter a private residence.  The “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine recognizes as 
much, and has for nearly fifty years.7  The second part of the King police-created 
exigency rule, however, is new and much more interesting.  Unfortunately, the 
precise contours of offensive, “threatening” police conduct are unclear. 
King raises additional questions. Are there constitutional limitations to the 
investigative police tactic known as a knock-and-talk?  And, exactly how should 
                                                                                                     
 * Jamesa J. Drake is a criminal defense attorney who lives in Maine and practices in state and 
federal court throughout the country.  She was counsel of record for Hollis Deshaun King and argued 
the case on his behalf before the U.S. Supreme Court. 
 1. Cf. Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (discussing the emergency aid exception 
species of exigent circumstances); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 40 (1963) (plurality opinion).  
 2. 131 S. Ct. 1849 (2011).   
 3. Id. at 1857. 
 4. Id.  
 5. Id. at 1862. 
 6. Id. at 1858. 
 7. See, e.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963). 
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people “stand on their constitutional rights” without simultaneously supplying 
either the probable cause or exigent circumstances or both necessary to support the 
warrantless entry of their home?8  These difficult questions are likely to surface in a 
substantial number of Fourth Amendment cases and this essay attempts to answer 
them.   
I.  THE FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
At around 9:50 p.m. on October 13, 2005, the Lexington, Kentucky police 
kicked in the door to King’s apartment.  They did not have a warrant. 
The police observed someone selling cocaine to an informant outside of King’s 
apartment complex.9  An undercover police officer radioed to three uniformed 
officers, who were waiting nearby, that the cocaine dealer entered the back right 
apartment of the apartment complex.10  The officers heard only part of the radio 
broadcast.  They did not hear (and did not independently know) which apartment 
the cocaine dealer entered.11  As the officers proceeded down the breezeway of the 
apartment complex, they heard a door slam.12  The officers did not know which 
apartment door they heard shut, and they did not know which apartment the 
cocaine dealer entered.13   
Midway down the breezeway, the officers detected the odor of burnt 
marijuana, which they believed emanated from the back left apartment.14  Officer 
Cobb, who was the only witness to testify at the hearing on King’s motion to 
suppress, gave the following account of what happened next: 
As we got into the hallway, about midway, there was a very strong odor of burnt 
marijuana inside the breezeway.  As we got closer to back left apartment, we could 
tell that it seemed to be the source of that, almost as if the door had been slammed 
right there.  Detective Maynard made contact with the door, announced our 
presence, banged on the door as loud as we could, announced, “Police, police, 
police.”15 
In response to further questioning by the prosecutor about exactly how the officers’ 
announced their presence at the door, Officer Cobb testified:  “Detective Maynard 
banged on the door, said, ‘This is the police.’”16 
Officer Cobb explained what happened next: 
As soon as we started banging on the door, Detective Maynard turned to Sergeant 
Simmons to let him know that we could hear people inside moving.  It sounded 
as—things were being moved inside the apartment.  
                                                                                                     
 8. King, 131 S. Ct. at 1862. 
 9. Petition Appendix at 2a, 35a, Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849 (2011) (No. 09-1272), 
[hereinafter Petition Appendix].   
 10. Id.   
 11. Id.   
 12. Id.   
 13. Id. at 3a, 35a. 
 14. Id. at 2a, 35a.   
 15. Joint Appendix at 22, Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 11849 (No. 09-1272) [hereinafter Joint 
Appendix].   
 16. Id. at 23.   
60 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:1 
. . .  
We knew that there was possibly something that was going to be destroyed inside 
the apartment. 
At that point, Detective Maynard, with the–   Sergeant Simmons–  and we 
explained to them we were going to make entry inside the apartment.  Detective 
Maynard attempted to get the–  to go–  to enter through the door, wasn’t able to, 
and that’s when I entered to through the door. 
. . .  
I kicked the door open.17 
King and two other people were inside, one of whom was sitting on the couch 
still smoking marijuana.18  The police observed marijuana on the coffee table in the 
middle of the room and cocaine sitting out on the kitchen counter.19  After the 
occupants’ arrest, a subsequent search of the apartment revealed additional drugs, 
drug paraphernalia, and $2,500 in cash.20  The police later entered the back right 
apartment and arrested the cocaine dealer.21   
At the suppression hearing, the parties and the trial court asked Cobb to 
explain what exactly he heard that lead him to believe that the destruction of 
evidence was imminent or underway.  Initially, Cobb testified: “It sounded as–  
things were being moved inside the apartment.”22 
In response to further questioning by the trial court, Officer Cobb clarified that 
he “couldn’t discern exactly” what it was that he heard after all: 
Q: When you were at the door of Apartment 78 and you said that you heard 
things being moved or heard movement inside the apartment, at first I thought you 
were talking about somebody moving furniture, but you’re talking about people 
moving around? 
A: Correct.  Now, whether–  Your Honor, whether they were moving furniture 
or things were being moved, we were just– 
Q: I just–  I just didn’t know whether you were talking about the screeching of 
couches being moved on the floor or whether it was just–  just foot traffic.  That’s 
all I was asking. 
A: I couldn’t discern exactly.23 
Cobb also candidly admitted that he believed that the occupants of King’s 
apartment were only “possibly” destroying evidence.  Cobb testified: 
Q: What did you-all do once you heard these things being moved around in the 
apartment? 
A: We know that there was possibly something that was going to be destroyed 
                                                                                                     
 17. Id. at 24.   
 18. Id. at 25-26; Petition Appendix, supra note 9, at 4a.   
 19. Joint Appendix, supra note 15, at 27, 49-50;Petition Appendix, supra note 9, at 4a-5a.   
 20. Petition Appendix, supra note 9, at 5a. 
 21. Id. at 6a, 35a. 
 22. Joint Appendix, supra note 15, at 24.   
 23. Id. at 58.   
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inside the apartment.24 
Later, Cobb reiterated: 
Q: What was your basis for believing you could enter the apartment that these 
defendants were in? 
A: There was a crime occurring inside and also possible destruction of evidence. 
Q: And isn’t it true that you actually wrote in your report that “We could hear 
persons inside the apartment and noises possibly consistent”–  is that right–  
“possibly consistent with the destruction of potential evidence”? 
A: Yes, I wrote “possibly consistent with the destruction of potential 
evidence.”25 
Cobb further acknowledged that as a matter of course, “people move in 
apartments” and that “[m]ost people answer the door when the police knock at the 
door also.”26   
The trial court made extensive, written findings of fact.  Regarding the 
officers’ conduct immediately prior to entering the apartment, the court found that: 
Det. Maynard, who was accompanying Officer Cobb in the breezeway attempting 
to locate and arrest the suspect in question, banged on the door of the apartment on 
the back left of the breezeway identifying themselves as police officers and 
demanding that the door be opened by the persons inside.27 
Regarding the noises that Cobb heard, the court found: 
After Det. Maynard announced the presence of the police officers at the door of 
the back left apartment, Apt 78, Officer Cobb and the others heard “things being 
moved in that apartment (78)”.  Officer Cobb later described the noise as people 
moving around as opposed to furniture being moved.28 
Regarding the officers’ reasons for entering King’s apartment, the court found: 
When asked directly to articulate the reasons which he thought justified the forced 
entry into Apt 78 (apartment on the back left of hall) by knocking down the door, 
Officer Cobb testified that he and the other officers thought that there was a crime 
occurring inside Apt 78 based on the strong odor of burnt marijuana being 
detected from under the door and, from the noise heard through the door, that its 
occupants were engaging in [the] destruction of evidence.29 
The Kentucky Supreme Court held in King’s favor, believing that it was 
reasonably foreseeable that the occupants would destroy evidence when the police 
knocked on the door and announced their presence.30  The U.S. Supreme Court 
granted certiorari and reversed, however, finding “no evidence that the officers 
                                                                                                     
 24. Id. at 24.   
 25. Id. at 40-41.   
 26. Id. at 41. 
 27. Petition Appendix, supra note 9, at 3a-4a (underline in original; emphasis added). 
 28. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 29. Id. at 6a.   
 30. King v. Commonwealth, 302 S.W.3d 649, 656 (Ky. 2010), rev’d and remanded sub nom. 
Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849 (2011). 
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either violated the Fourth Amendment or threatened to do so prior to the point 
when they entered the apartment.”31  Having decided that the police-created 
exigency doctrine did not preclude entry into the apartment, the Court remanded 
the case to the Kentucky Supreme Court to determine whether the circumstances 
confronting the officers were truly exigent.32  On remand, the Kentucky Supreme 
Court held that exigent circumstances did not exist.33 The court reasoned that “the 
sounds as described at the suppression hearing were indistinguishable from 
ordinary household sounds, and were consistent with the natural and reasonable 
result of a knock on the door” and that the prosecution “must show something more 
than a possibility that evidence is being destroyed to defeat the presumption of an 
unreasonable search and seizure.”34  Ultimately, the defendant in King prevailed.  
The police did not lawfully enter his apartment.   
II.  KING’S PRACTICAL APPLICATION IS FAR FROM CERTAIN 
Law enforcement, lawyers, and lower courts can all be forgiven for struggling 
to understand the practical implications of King.  As a general matter, the Supreme 
Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence consists of a “byzantine patchwork of 
protections” that is “a mess, an embarrassment, and a mass of contradictions.”35   
Complicating things further, Fourth Amendment cases are notoriously fact-
specific.36  They often present the same general fact outline,37 but the devil is in the 
details.  Small factual deviations among cases often explain different legal 
outcomes.  King is a particularly challenging opinion to extrapolate from and 
properly apply because the officers’ conduct strays significantly from even the 
generic narrative; the facts in King “read[] a bit like a Cheech and Chong script.”38  
The Court’s failure to acknowledge that the officers’ conduct in King was 
                                                                                                     
 31. King, 131 S. Ct. at 1863. 
 32. Id. at 1862-64. 
 33. King v. Commonwealth, No. 2008-SC-000274-DG, 2012 WL 1450081 at *3 (Ky. April 26, 
2012), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Kentucky v. King, No. 12-140 (July 25, 2012). 
 34. Id. at *3 (emphasis added). 
 35. Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment Cases, 125 HARV. 
L. REV. 476, 479 (2011) (internal citations omitted); see also California v. Acevado, 500 U.S. 565, 582 
(1982) (Scalia, J, concurring) (“the ‘warrant requirement’ [has] become so riddled with exceptions that 
it [is] basically unrecognizable”); Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring) (“The course of true law pertaining to searches and seizures . . . has not—to put it mildly—
run smooth.”). 
 36. Cf. Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996) (“[T]he ‘touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is 
reasonableness.’ . . . [W]e have consistently eschewed bright-line rules, instead emphasizing the fact-
specific nature of the reasonableness inquiry.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 37. For example:  Police officer observes traffic violation; officer initiates traffic stop; driver stops; 
officer requests driver’s license, registration, and proof of insurance; driver complies; officer notices the 
odor of narcotics, or alcohol on the driver’s breath, or believes that the driver is behaving suspiciously; 
officer asks the driver to exit the vehicle; officer requests consent to search the vehicle, or officer 
requests that the driver submit to field sobriety tests; driver complies; officer’s vehicle search uncovers 
contraband, or officer concludes that the driver is intoxicated, etc. 
 38. Dahlia Lithwick, Crime and Blandishments: What happens when Supreme Court justices try to 
think like criminal suspects, SLATE.COM (Jan. 12, 2011), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/supreme_court_dispatches/2011/01/crime_and_blandis
hments.html. 
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atypical,39 and its concomitant failure to acknowledge that the “criminals” in King 
responded to the officers’ conduct in the same manner as any “innocent” person 
would, raises a variety of different—and newly vexing—questions about the 
fulcrum point between lawful and unlawful police activity.     
A.  Knock-and-Talk 
At nearly ten o’clock at night, three uniformed police officers “banged” on the 
door to King’s apartment “as loud as [they] could” and “announced” either “This is 
the police” or “Police, police, police.”40  By their own admission, the police were 
not seeking a consensual encounter with the occupants of King’s apartment.  They 
were in pursuit of a cocaine dealer, who they believed was inside.  The King Court, 
however, saw things differently. 
The King Court repeatedly analogized the officers’ conduct to an investigative 
tactic known as a “knock-and-talk” and, in so doing, greatly expanded the legal 
bounds of a police practice that many had argued needs more, not less, restriction.41  
A knock-and-talk   
 involves officers knocking on the door of a house, identifying themselves as 
officers, asking to talk to the occupant about a criminal complaint, and eventually 
requesting permission to search the house.  If successful, it allows police officers 
who lack probable cause to gain access to a house and conduct a search.42   
This technique is highly effective at procuring warrantless searches and, therefore, 
routinely utilized.43  It is also highly vulnerable to abuse or misuse; the fact that the 
police do not need probable cause in order to conduct a knock-and-talk gives them 
free reign to approach any house they wish for any reason or for no particular 
                                                                                                     
 39. For example, controlled drug buys between an undercover police officer and a drug trafficker 
are a fairly common occurrence, and it is not unusual for the trafficker to retreat to a different location 
before his eventual apprehension.  See Alex Harocopos & Mike Hough, Drug Dealing in Open-Air 
Markets, CENTER FOR PROBLEM-ORIENTED POLICING 24 (Aug. 2011), 
http://www.popcenter.org/problems/pdfs/DrugMarkets.pdf.  In King, however, the lead detective in 
charge of the undercover sting operation knew exactly where the cocaine dealer was at all times, Joint 
Appendix, supra note 15, at 19-21, but the officers responsible for apprehending the dealer pursued the 
cocaine dealer prematurely, lost radio contact with the lead detective, and had no idea where the dealer 
actually went, id. at 42-45.  The officers were supposed to be pursuing a cocaine dealer, but they became 
distracted by the odor of burnt marijuana emanating from King’s apartment and somehow concluded 
that marijuana use was indicative of cocaine trafficking.  Id. at 46-47.  The police entered King’s 
apartment to prevent the destruction of “narcotics evidence” after hearing either “screeching of couches 
being moved” or “foot traffic,” although they curiously “couldn’t discern exactly” between the two.  Id. 
at 58. 
 40. Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1854 (2011). 
 41. See, e.g., Craig M. Bradley, “Knock and Talk” and the Fourth Amendment, 84 IND. L. J. 1099 
(2009). 
 42. State v. Reinier, 628 N.W.2d 460, 466 (Iowa 2001). 
 43. Andrew Eppich, Comment, Wolf at the Door:  Issues of Place and Race in the Use of the Knock 
and Talk Policing Technique, 32 B.C. J.L. & SOC. JUST. 119, 121-22 n.29 (2012) (quoting William Dean 
Hinton, Knock and Talk, ORLANDO WKLY. (Jan. 9, 2003), 
http://www2.orlandoweekly.com/features/story.asp?id=2940) (reporting that the Central Florida Orange 
County Sheriff’s Office “alone performs an estimated 300 such ‘knock and talk’ encounters each 
month,” and that there is an entire squad within the sheriff’s office dedicated to carrying out knock and 
talks). 
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reason at all.  In this context, there are no limitations on the number of fishing 
expeditions the police may undertake.  And any “unusual” sights, sounds, or smells 
that the police may detect can form the basis for reasonable suspicion or probable 
cause to investigate further.   
Courts have approved of the procedure, largely on theory that  
[a]bsent express orders from the person in possession against any possible 
trespass, there is no rule of private or public conduct which makes it illegal per se, 
or a condemned invasion of the person’s right of privacy, for anyone openly and 
peaceably, at high noon, to walk up the steps and knock on the front door of any 
man’s ‘castle’ with the honest intent of asking questions of the occupant thereof 
whether the questioner be a pollster, a salesman, or an officer of the law.44   
The Supreme Court echoed that sentiment in King:  “[O]fficers may seek consent-
based encounters if they are lawfully present in the place where the consensual 
encounter occurs.  If consent is freely given it makes no difference that an officer 
may have approached the person with the hope or expectation of obtaining 
consent.”45   
The difficulty with this logic, of course, is that a pollster or a salesman is eager 
to quickly determine whether an occupant is at home and willing to come to the 
door, and then to move on to the next house.  The police have an entirely different 
agenda.   
The base assumption in knock-and-talk cases is that “[w]hen law enforcement 
officers who are not armed with a warrant knock on a door they do no more than 
any private citizen might do.”46  When the police deviate from this, by doing 
something different than any other citizen would, they risk running afoul of the 
Fourth Amendment.  For example, coercive conduct during the course of a knock-
and-talk compromises the voluntariness of the homeowner’s consent, making any 
resulting consent-based entry or search unlawful.47 
A knock-and-talk is quite different from the “knock-and-announce” 
requirement, although both are relevant to the facts in King.  The knock-and-
announce rule is “a command of the Fourth Amendment”; it requires that, in most 
situations, “law enforcement officers must announce their presence and provide 
residents an opportunity to open the door” before executing a search warrant.48  
The knock-and-announce rule precedes an officer’s forcible—and preordained—
entry into the home.49  Accordingly, both the “knock” and the “announcement” are 
aggressive, authoritative, and intended to intimidate.50  The idea is not to gain the 
occupant’s consent to search; rather, the goal is to give the occupants “the 
                                                                                                     
 44. Id. at 129 (quoting Davis v. United States, 327 F.2d 301, 303 (9th Cir. 1964)). 
 45. King, 131 S. Ct. at 1858 (internal citation omitted). 
 46. Id. at 1862. 
 47. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 228 (1973) (“[T]he Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendments require that a consent not be coerced . . . .”). 
 48. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 589 (2006); see also Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 
387 (1997) (discussing exceptions to the “knock-and-announce” rule). 
 49. Hudson, 547 U.S. at 594. 
 50. See, e.g., United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 33 (2003) (officers complying with the “knock 
and announce” requirement “rapped hard enough on the door to be heard by officers at the back door” 
before  opening “the front door with a battering ram”). 
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opportunity to comply with the law and to avoid the destruction of property 
occasioned by a forcible entry.”51  The Respondent in King argued that the officers’ 
conduct was more akin to a “knock and announce” than a “knock and talk.”52  But 
the Court rejected that argument.53 
The Court’s suggestion that the officers in King were simply engaged in a 
“knock and talk” and its conclusion that it was presented with “no evidence” that 
the officers “threatened” to violate the Fourth Amendment before entering the 
apartment, are all difficult to square with the Court’s prior case law and with the 
“totality of the circumstances” approach that it adheres to in Fourth Amendment 
cases.  In particular, harmonizing King with Bumper v. North Carolina54 and 
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte55 is challenging.  
1.  Bumper v. North Carolina and Police Conduct that  
“Threatens” to Violate the Fourth Amendment 
In Bumper, four police officers went to the home of “Mrs. Hattie Leath, a 66-
year old Negro widow,” and one of them announced, “I have a search warrant to 
search your house.”56  Mrs. Leath complied.57  Inside, the police found evidence 
that was later introduced in the trial of Mrs. Leath’s grandson.58  Because the police 
did not actually have a warrant to search Mrs. Leath’s home, the prosecution was 
forced to argue that Mrs. Leath consented to a search of her home.59 
The U.S. Supreme Court concluded:  “When a law enforcement officer claims 
authority to search a home under a warrant, he announces in effect that the 
occupant has no right to resist the search.  The situation is instinct with coercion—
albeit colorably lawful coercion.  Where there is coercion there cannot be 
consent.”60  Bumper is widely understood to stand for the broader proposition that, 
in a warrantless search situation, the prosecution’s burden of proving that the 
homeowner’s consent was voluntarily given cannot be discharged by showing 
“acquiescence” to a show of authority.61 
On the surface, King appears to reaffirm Bumper.  It would be strange indeed 
for the Court to conclude, as it did in Bumper, that the consent exception to the 
warrant requirement is unavailable to the police when they claim authority to 
search that they do not actually have, but that the police may freely rely on the 
exigent circumstances exception under the same set of facts.  Accordingly, in the 
parlance of the King opinion, lower courts might safely assume that a police 
officer’s false claim of authority “threatens” to violate the Fourth Amendment.  In 
fact, the King Court seems to have been thinking about Bumper when it provides 
                                                                                                     
 51. Id. (quoting Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 393 n.5 (1997)). 
 52. Brief for Respondent at 30, Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849 (2011). 
 53. King, 131 S. Ct. at 1863. 
 54. 391 U.S. 543 (1968). 
 55. 412 U.S. 218 (1973). 
 56. Bumper, 391 U.S. at 546. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 550. 
 61. Id. at 548-49. 
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the opinion’s only example of police conduct that “threatens” to violate the Fourth 
Amendment—i.e., “by announcing that they would break down the door if the 
occupants did not open the door voluntarily.”62  The Court also seems to have been 
thinking about Bumper when it noted that “[t]here is a strong argument to be made 
that, at least in most circumstances, the exigent circumstances rule should not apply 
where the police, without a warrant or any legally sound basis for a warrantless 
entry, threaten that they will enter without permission unless admitted.”63 
A closer reading of King, however, may suggest a fundamental shift in the 
Court’s treatment of false claims of police authority.  The Court begins its analysis 
of what the police actually did—knocking as loudly as they could and announcing 
either “This is the police” or “Police, police, police”—by rejecting the trial court’s 
assessment that the officers’ “demanded” entry to King’s apartment.64  Although 
the Court may have intended this passage as a critique of the trial court’s factual 
findings,65 an alternative reading—and one that seems more plausible—is that the 
Court views the trial court’s “demand” characterization as a legal term of art—i.e., 
the officers’ conduct simply did not constitute a “demand” as a matter of law.66  
Accordingly, one might equate an officer’s “demand” with the sort of “threat” that 
violates the Fourth Amendment whenever the demand exceeds the bounds of the 
officer’s lawful authority.  This reading of King harmonizes it with Bumper.   
The question then becomes:  what—if anything—did the officers in King 
“demand” of the apartment’s occupants?  The Court identifies two types of 
demands that the police might make: a demand that the occupants open the door,67 
and a demand that the occupants permit the police to enter.68  The Court ultimately 
concludes that the police officers did not demand entry into King’s apartment 
because “no such actual threat was made.”69  Further, the Court concludes that 
there was “no evidence” that the officers demanded that the occupants open the 
door because the police did not “announc[e] that they would break down the door if 
the occupants did not open the door voluntarily.”70 
This logic is troubling for two distinct reasons.  First, it appears as though an 
officer’s conduct qualifies as “threatening” only if the threat or demand is expressly 
                                                                                                     
 62. Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1863 (2011). 
 63. Id. at 1858 n.4. 
 64. Id. at 1854. 
 65. The Court rejects the trial court’s “demand” assessment as inconsistent “with the testimony at 
the suppression hearing and with the findings of the state appellate courts.”  Id. at 1863. 
 66. Cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a) (“Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous and 
due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.”). 
 67. See King, 131 S. Ct. at 1863 (the police threaten to violate the Fourth Amendment “by 
announcing that they would break down the door if the occupants did not open the door voluntarily” 
(emphasis added)). 
 68. Id. at 1858 n.4 (“There is a strong argument to be made that, at least in most circumstances, the 
exigent circumstances rule should not apply where the police, without a warrant or any legally sound 
basis for a warrantless entry, threaten that they will enter without permission unless admitted.” 
(emphasis added)). 
 69. Id. (“In this case, however, no such actual threat was made, and therefore we have no need to 
reach that question.”). 
 70. Id. at 1863. 
2012] KENTUCKY V. KING 67 
made.71  The Court’s insistence on an “actual threat” or an “announcement” by the 
officers that the homeowners must behave in a particular manner is new.  It 
suggests a severely constrained reading of Bumper, and it is at odds with the 
Court’s extensive case law—in both the Fourth and Fifth Amendment contexts— 
which recognizes that people may be strongly influenced by both overt and subtle 
police tactics.72 
Second, if, as the Court acknowledges, an occupant “has no obligation to open 
the door to speak” to the police, and if, as the Court opines, threating police 
conduct that induces or coerces an occupant to open the door offends the police-
created exigency doctrine, then the Court’s insistence that there was “no evidence” 
of such a threat in King is plainly wrong—although the Court’s observation that 
there was no actual threat to that effect is correct. In Fourth Amendment cases, 
police conduct is evaluated from the standpoint of a putative “reasonable person,”73 
and courts are instructed to consider the “totality of the circumstances.”74  At nearly 
ten o’clock at night, three uniformed police officers “banged on the door” to King’s 
apartment “as loudly as they could” and announced either “Police, police, police” 
or “This is the police.”  In those circumstances, who wouldn’t come to the door?   
The Court’s knock-and-announce cases are instructive here.  The Court has 
long recognized that an authoritative knock followed by the announcement of a 
police presence is designed to induce the occupants to open the door so that the 
police may avoid breaking it with a battering ram.75  Moreover, the Court has 
repeatedly presumed that such police conduct will, in fact, compel a response from 
the occupants.76 
The problem with the logic in King becomes more pronounced when the 
Court’s treatment of the “genuine exigency” question is factored into the analysis.  
In addition to deciding whether the police created or manufactured the exigency, 
courts also must consider whether the situation confronting the officers was truly 
exigent.77  The King Court expressly reserved that question for the Kentucky 
Supreme Court to address on remand, reasoning that “[a]ny question about whether 
an exigency actually existed is better addressed by [that court].”78  But that 
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question should not have been difficult for the Court to answer.  In the middle of 
the night, any reasonable person would naturally respond to an officer’s loud 
banging and announcement of “Police, police, police”—not necessarily by opening 
the door, but at least by moving in some way (for example, by jolting out of bed)—
and, given that this Court presumes that people will move in response to an 
authoritative knock–and-announce, the Court should have easily concluded that the 
officers’ conduct in King induced some degree of movement on the part of the 
apartment’s occupants.  Recall that it was the sound of “people moving around 
inside” that the officers pointed to as proof that evidence was “possibly” being 
destroyed. 
If, as the Court appears to suggest, the officers’ conduct in King did not induce 
a response from the occupants—e.g., “movement”—then it is exceedingly difficult 
for lower courts to know when the police have “created” an exigency.  The Court 
observes that but-for causation will exist in every exigent circumstances case.79  
But its treatment of the sequence of events in King creates a whole host of new 
questions about exactly how extreme the officers’ conduct must be before it can be 
said to constitute a “demand” of some sort, or before it can be said to exceed the 
sort of but-for causation that the Court envisions exists in every case. 
The officers’ conduct in King surely constitutes “some” evidence of an implicit 
demand that the occupants respond to the show of police authority.80  Certainly, 
had the prosecution relied on the consent exception to the warrant requirement as 
opposed to the exigent circumstances exception, the officers’ conduct would have 
constituted “some” evidence that consent was coerced. 
By analogizing what the officers in King did to a simple knock-and-talk, the 
Court appears to suggest that the police did not “show authority” at all.  The notion 
that what the police in King did was “no more than any private citizen might do” is 
not only absurd, but also greatly expands an officer’s ability to conduct a knock-
and-tal” investigation—including doing so at night.81  There is a manifest 
difference between “banging” on the door at ten o’clock at night and hearing 
someone yell out, “It’s John, your next door neighbor!” and another when the 
person yells, “Police, police police” or “This is the Police.” 
The Court’s attempt to justify the officers’ behavior in the context of a knock-
and-talk is difficult to accept.  The Court states the obvious when it notes that 
“[p]olice officers may have a very good reason to announce their presence loudly 
and to knock on the door with some force.  Furthermore, unless police officers 
identify themselves loudly enough, occupants may not know who is at their door 
step.”82  But this does not mean that the police have not acted in a coercive or 
threatening manner, to some degree.  Furthermore, why the police did what they 
did—i.e., the officers’ subjective intent—is irrelevant.  King admonishes that the 
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reasonableness analysis looks to “objective standards.”83  The question is not 
whether the police had a good reason for doing what they did; rather, the question 
is how a reasonable person would interpret their conduct, the officers’ motives—
good or bad—aside. 
The facts in King stray so far from the typical knock-and-talk scenario84 that 
lower courts should avoid reading too much into the King opinion, the foregoing 
notwithstanding.  After all, the King Court provided one—and only one—example 
of the type of police conduct that might constitute a “threat” that violates the Fourth 
Amendment.  By failing to define the concept further, the Court has implicitly 
invited lower courts to attempt their own definitions.  Lower courts are at liberty, 
should they choose, to take a rather broad view of the term.  Courts should 
conclude that the very same type of police conduct that undermines the 
voluntariness of a homeowner’s consent also violates the police-created exigency 
doctrine.  Police activity, including but not limited to false claims of police 
authority, that is coercive or potentially coercive in one context (Bumper) should 
also qualify as some evidence of a threatened Fourth Amendment violation in a 
different context (King).   
2.  Schneckloth v. Bustamonte and the King Court’s (Un)willingness to  
Consider the Totality of the Circumstances 
In the context of evaluating whether the police “threatened” to violate the 
Fourth Amendment, the Respondent in King urged the Court to consider “the 
officers’ tone of voice in announcing their presence and the forcefulness of their 
knocks.”85  The Court refused, noting that “the ability of law enforcement officers 
to respond to an exigency cannot turn on such subtleties.”86  The difficulty with 
considering such facts, the Court explained, is that  
it would be extremely difficult for police officers to know how loudly they may 
announce their presence or how forcefully they may knock without running afoul 
of the police-created exigency rule.  And in most cases, it would be nearly 
impossible for a court to determine whether that threshold had been passed.87   
This reasoning in King would have come as a surprise to the predecessor 
Schneckloth Court. 
The Court has considered the “subtleties” of police conduct in Fourth 
Amendment cases for nearly forty years.  In the seminal case of Schneckloth v. 
Bustamonte, for example, the Court repeatedly instructed that the “totality of the 
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circumstances approach” utilized in Fourth Amendment cases requires an 
assessment “of all the surrounding circumstances,” including such factors as 
“subtly coercive police questions” and “the possibly vulnerable subjective state of 
the person” being questioned.88  Clearly, those factors are at least as difficult to 
measure as the forcefulness of an officer’s knock on the door.  Time and again, the 
Schneckloth Court recognized that “subtle” and “implicit” conduct on the part of 
the police may have a significant impact on how a reasonable person perceives the 
situation.89  And it has directed the lower courts to examine both “the nature” of the 
police conduct and “the environment in which it took place.”90 
The King Court’s unwillingness to consider the “subtleties” of police conduct 
for purposes of the police-created exigency doctrine, on the theory that “it would be 
nearly impossible for a court” to do so, gives the lower courts far too little credit.  
Courts already consider these—and many other—”nebulous” factors in the Fourth 
Amendment context; they are well equipped to do so, and have been doing so ever 
since Schneckloth was decided.91 
In addition, by excising the officers’ tone of voice or the forcefulness of their 
knock from the analysis of whether the police “threatened” to violate the Fourth 
Amendment, the Court does more than simply underestimate the lower courts’ 
ability to sift through Schneckloth-like facts.  It sanitizes the police conduct to such 
a degree that any amount of “banging” qualifies as a simple “knock,” and the tone 
of an announcement, however menacing or intimidating, qualifies as a simple 
declaration of the officers’ presence.  Again, this greatly enlarges the traditional 
notion of a knock-and-talk, and it creates a strange dichotomy between the consent 
and exigent circumstances exceptions to the warrant requirement.   
Lower courts should continue to evaluate the “totality” of the circumstances as 
they always have, even when applying the police-created exigency rule.  And they 
should make every attempt not to create a substantial theoretical rift between the 
consent and exigent circumstances exceptions to the warrant requirement.  It is 
difficult to conceive of the logic that would support such a division.  The King 
Court’s concern that “it would be extremely difficult for police officers to know 
how loudly they may announce their presence or how forcefully they may knock on 
a door without running afoul of the police-created exigency rule” is part and parcel 
of a much larger debate that was settled—and almost certainly remains settled, 
King notwithstanding—decades ago.92  Bright-line rules in the Fourth Amendment 
context have the obvious benefit of better enabling the police to avoid 
“unreasonable” conduct.  But, the modern Court has “consistently eschewed bright-
line rules, instead emphasizing the fact-specific nature of the reasonableness 
inquiry.”93  Dictum in the King opinion is unlikely to change that abiding 
precedent. 
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B.  Asserting Constitutional Rights 
To underscore the supposedly voluntary nature of a knock-and-talk, the King 
Court makes much of the notion that an “occupant has no obligation to open the 
door or to speak.”94  The encounter will simply end, the Court suggests, whenever 
the occupants “choose not to respond or to speak.”95  Moreover, the Court explains, 
“even if an occupant chooses to open the door and speak with the officers, the 
occupant need not allow the officers to enter the premises and may refuse to answer 
any questions at any time.”96  Occupants have the option to “stand on their 
constitutional rights”97 and either ignore or rebuke the police. 
Whether this is a highly idealized notion of the way that ordinary Americans 
regard police-citizen encounters is a subject for a different article.  One could easily 
argue that the foregoing, coupled with the Court’s suggestion that “[c]itizens who 
are startled by an unexpected knock on the door or by the sight of unknown persons 
in plain clothes on their doorstep may be relieved to learn that these persons are 
police officers,” evinces a majority of the Justices’ profound misunderstanding of 
community-police relations in many pockets of this country.98  Moreover, the 
Court’s track record in cases where homeowners or other citizens have attempted to 
“stand on their constitutional rights” is not good.  The Court’s precedent strongly 
suggests that people who attempt to stand on their rights often do so at their own 
peril.  Two cases are particularly instructive. 
In California v. Hodari D.,99 two police officers wearing jackets with “Police” 
embossed on both the front and back were on patrol in a high-crime area when they 
observed four or five youths huddled around a parked car.100  When the youths saw 
the officers, “they apparently panicked, and took flight.”101  The officers “were 
suspicious and gave chase.”102  During the course of the chase, Hodari discarded an 
item that was later determined to be crack cocaine.103  The question before the 
Supreme Court was “whether, at the time he dropped the drugs, Hodari had been 
‘seized’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”104  Hodari argued that the 
officers’ show of authority triggered the Fourth Amendment’s protection against 
“unreasonable” seizures; that he was seized without the requisite level of 
reasonable suspicion; and that the drugs were the fruit of an unlawful seizure and 
thus properly excluded by the lower court.105  The Respondent argued that Hodari 
was not “seized,” and therefore not entitled to any Fourth Amendment protection, 
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and that Hodari had simply abandoned the drugs, which were subsequently 
recovered lawfully by the police.   
A person is under no legal obligation to speak with a police officer.106  In 
King’s parlance, Hodari “stood on his constitutional rights” by running away; 
although running from the police is somewhat dramatic, there is no requirement 
that any person stay put and wait to see what, if anything, an officer might need or 
want.  Nevertheless, the Court chastised Hodari for asserting his constitutional right 
to be left alone,107 and it admonished the rest of us against doing the same.  The 
Court cautioned that “compliance with police orders  . . .  should . . . be 
encouraged.  Only a few of those orders, we must presume, will be without 
adequate basis, and since the addressee has no ready means of identifying the 
deficient ones it almost invariably is the responsible course to comply.”108  This 
advice is especially ironic because the California Court of Appeals had already 
decided that the police lacked a reasonable basis for suspecting Hodari of any 
criminal wrongdoing—a conclusion that was not reversed by the Supreme Court on 
appeal.109 
The Court held that because Hodari ran from the police—i.e., because he 
“stood on his constitutional rights” to be left alone and to be free from an 
unreasonable seizure—Hodari was, in fact, not “seized” at all.  In other words, 
Hodari cost himself the protection of the Fourth Amendment when he asserted the 
very rights that the Fourth Amendment aims to protect; had he submitted to the 
police (notwithstanding the fact that the officers’ show of authority was 
“unreasonable”), he would have benefited from the Fourth Amendment’s 
exclusionary rule. 
In a different case, decided after King, the homeowner’s decision to stand on 
her constitutional rights proved perilous as well.  In Ryburn v. Huff,110 a high 
school principal informed the police that a student, Huff, was rumored to have 
written a letter threatening to “shoot up” the school.  The police went to Huff’s 
house, “knocked on the door,” and identified themselves as police officers.111  
When no one responded, the police called Huff’s mother’s cell phone.112   Huff’s 
mother answered the phone, told the police that she and her son were inside, and 
then hung up when the police told her that they were outside and requested to speak 
with her.113  Several minutes later, Huff and his mother came outside and stood on 
the front steps.114  The police asked if “they could continue the discussion inside 
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the house,” but Huff’s mother refused.115  The police then asked if there were any 
guns in the house, and Mrs. Huff “responded by ‘immediately turning around and 
running into the house.’”116  One of the officers entered the house without a 
warrant; he was “scared because he didn’t know what was in that house” and had 
“seen too many officers killed.”117  Eventually, Huff’s father challenged the 
officers’ authority to be inside his house, and they left.118   
The Huffs sued the police under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.119  A divided panel of the 
Ninth Circuit concluded that “any belief that the officers or other family members 
were in serious, imminent harm would have been objectively unreasonable given 
that Mrs. Huff merely asserted her right to end her conversation with the officers 
and returned to her home.”120  The majority determined that  
it was irrelevant that the Huffs did not respond when the officers knocked on the 
door and announced their presence . . . because the Huffs had no legal obligation 
to respond to a knock . . . .  And, . . . the officers should not have been concerned 
by Mrs. Huff’s reaction when they asked her if there were any guns in the house 
because Mrs. Huff merely asserted her right to end her conversation with the 
officers and returned to her home.121 
The Supreme Court reversed in a tersely-written per curiam opinion.  Before 
holding that the police lawfully entered the Huff residence because  
there was an objectively reasonable basis for fearing that violent was imminent,” 
the Court admonished that “the panel majority apparently seems to have taken the 
view that conduct cannot be regarded as a matter of concern so long as it is lawful 
. . . . It should go without saying, however, that there are many circumstances in 
which lawful conduct may portend imminent violence.122   
Together, King, Hodari D., and Ryburn appear to instruct that a homeowner’s 
theoretical ability to stand on her constitutional rights may serve as a post-hoc 
justification for the reasonableness of police conduct—at the direct expense of the 
homeowner.  The message, it appears, is that a homeowner can assert her right to 
be free from the unwarranted entry of her home, but that she should be careful 
about doing so because “lawful conduct may portend imminent violence” or the 
destruction of evidence or any other exigency that a court or a savvy police officer 
can conjure.  Although King recognizes that, technically, a homeowner can “stand 
on her constitutional rights” and refuse to respond to the police presence at her 
door, Hodari D. cautions that “it almost invariably is the responsible course to 
comply” with the police.  If compliance means moving about the house in order to 
open the door, as it almost certainly does, then the homeowner runs the risk—as 
was the case in King—of making some sort of movement that is “indicative,” at 
least in the minds of some police officers, of evidence destruction.  Worse, Ryburn 
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suggests that not responding at all—e.g., sitting silent and simply hoping that the 
police go away—is suspicious behavior in its own right.  Exacerbating things 
further, the Ryburn Court admonishes lower courts to “be cautious about second-
guessing a police officer’s assessment, made on the scene, of the danger presented 
by a particular situation.”123   
This naturally raises two questions.  First, as a practical matter, what is a 
citizen to do when the police come “knocking” at the door?  And, second, precisely 
how should a lower court interpret a homeowner’s decision to “stand on her 
constitutional rights”?   
If the police lack probable cause or even reasonable suspicion of any criminal 
activity on the part of the occupants of a home, it seems fairly safe to assume that a 
citizen who rebukes the police is on safe constitutional footing.  The difficulty, of 
course, is that when deciding how to respond to the police, the homeowner is 
almost certainly unaware of what information (if any) the police have gathered 
about him or her.  If the police have any reason to suspect that something might be 
awry, then Hodari D. and Ryburn together caution that “standing on constitutional 
rights” is a poor course of action; it may supply the probable cause that had 
previously eluded the police.  A lawyer might be inclined, then, to advise her 
clients to respond to the police presence and to very politely assert the right to be 
left alone.  Whether most people could actually stay calm and level-headed enough 
to do that (especially if the police come calling at ten o’clock at night, banging, and 
announcing, “Police, police, police”) is an entirely different matter. 
King, Hodari D., and Ryburn notwithstanding, lower courts should zealously 
guard a person’s right, when appropriately asserted, to either terminate an 
encounter with the police or to decline an officer’s invitation for an encounter in 
the first place.  Nothing about King, Hodari D., or Ryburn alters the core tenets of 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  As the Court explained in the seminal case of 
Weeks v. United States:124  
[t]he effect of the 4th Amendment is to put the courts of the United States and 
Federal officials, in the exercise of their power and authority, under limitations and 
restraints as to the exercise of such power and authority . . . .  This protection 
reaches all alike, whether accused of crime or not, and the duty of giving to it force 
and effect is obligatory upon all intrusted under our Federal system with the 
enforcement of the laws.125   
Fourth Amendment protection is at its apex when the police enter or search a 
person’s home without a warrant,126 and even the most well-intentioned police 
officers are susceptible to misjudgment when “engaged in the often competitive 
enterprise of ferreting out crime.”127  Nothing about King alters these precepts.  At 
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the very least, courts should exercise extreme caution when citing to a citizen’s 
invocation of his or her Fourth Amendment rights as a justification for any 
subsequent police action. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
Because King simply gave a name to a concept that nearly all lower courts had 
already recognized some time ago, i.e., “the police-created exigency doctrine,”128 
and because the Court-articulated test for evaluating when the police violate that 
doctrine is wide open to different interpretations, the most one can say about King’s 
lasting impact is that it is the beginning—but certainly not the end—of what may 
become a long line of police-created-exigency cases.  Ultimately, it will be difficult 
for a lower court to interpret King because it provides precious little guidance about 
the meaning of “threatening” conduct, about where the constitutional margins of a 
permissible knock-and-talk lie, or about how, exactly, a homeowner should stand 
on her constitutional rights.   
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